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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
THE SCOPE OF THE TEXAS RECORDING ACT
Dwight A. Olds*
IN Moran v. Wheeler' it is said:
When a purchaser who seeks to buy land has examined th rec-
ords of titles, and finds nothing to indicate that there is an adverse
claim, and he is not in possession of any facts that would put him upon
inquiry as to any matter not of record, he has the right to presume that
any person claiming an adverse right would have placed the same upon
record, and that there is none.
In Johnson v. Darr2 it is said:
When a right is solely and exclusively of legislative creation and does
not derive existence from the common law or principles of equity and
creates a new right by statute, the courts will not extend the applica-
tion of the statute, but will limit its application to the exact words of
the Act.
These quotations indicate a divergence in the conception of
the scope of the recording act in Texas-Article 6627 of the Texas
Revised Civil Statutes (1925). It reads as follows:
All bargains, sales and other conveyances whatever, of any land, tene-
ments and hereditaments, whether they may be made for passing any
estate of freehold of inheritance or for a term of years; and deeds of
settlement upon marriage, whether land, money or other personal thing;
and all deeds of trust and mortgages shall be void as to all creditors and
subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, un-
less they shall be acknowledged or proved and filed with the clerk, to be
recorded as required by law, but the same as between the parties and
their heirs, and as to all subsequent purchasers, with notice thereof or
without valuable consideration, shall be valid and binding.
*A.B., LL.B., LL.M.; Professor of Law, University of Houston; member of the
Kansas and Oklahoma Bars.
187 Tex. 179, 184, 27 S. W. 54, 55, 56 (1894).
2114 Tex. 516, 520, 272 S. W. 1098, 1099 (1925). And see Brown & Co. v. Chancellor,
61 Tex. 437, 444 (1884) ; Adams v. Hayden, 60 Tex. 223, 226, 227 (1883).
See Bryan v. Texas Life Ins. Co., 248 S. W. 163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) er. dism.,
holding there is no implied exception as to minority.
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Article 6626' (the so-called "may" statute) contains no penalty
for failure to record 4 and is not treated herein as a recording
statute, though its effect is referred to later.
It is the purpose of this discussion to see which view more
closely represents the case law in Texas. The discussion will con-
cern itself with the following questions:
1. Is an interest not in writing within the recording law?
2. Are equitable interests within the recording law?
3. Are any interests other than those described in Article
6627 within the recording law?
4. Does the recording law resolve the conflict between con-
flicting claims, one of which is not subject to the recording law?
5. What is the difference between a purchaser under the equi-
table doctrine of bona fide purchase and a purchaser under the
recording law?
6. How does the recording law operate with respect to con-
flicting claims within its provisions?
I. Is an interest not in writing within the recording law?
Article 6627 presupposes some paper setting forth the interest
in question; this is further emphasized by the requirement of
acknowledgment as a prerequisite to recordation. While not
explicit that a writing is necessary, it is surely implicit. For exam.
ple, it is held that title by adverse possession is outside the record-
ing law because there is nothing which can be recorded.5 The
3 "The following instruments of writing which shall have been acknowledged or
proved according to law, are authorized to be recorded, viz.: all deeds, mortgages, con-
veyances, deeds of trust, bonds for title, covenants, defeasances or other instruments
of writing concerning any lands or tenements, or goods and chattels, or movable prop-
erty of any description .... "
4 Shear Co. v. Currie, 295 Fed. 841 (5th Cir. 1923).
5 Houston Oil Co. v. Olive Sternenberg & Co., 222 S. W. 534 (Tex. Comm. App.
1920); MacGregor v. Thompson, 26 S. W. 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
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interest in community property of the spouse not named in the
deed is another.6 The list can be expanded to include resulting
and constructive trusts, 7 easements by prescription,8  title by
descent,9 the grantor's lien1" and other equitable liens, right of
reformation or rescission, and easements by necessity. 2 These
interests usually arise by operation of law,' 8 not by agreement
of the parties.
It may be objected that there is a paper in some situations
which is made the basis of a claim. But unless the paper itself
discloses the interest, the interest is unrecordable. And this on
reflection must be so, as the theory of the recording law is that
an inspection of the record shall itself disclose the interest. 4
It will be further noted that some of the non-written interests
are legal and some are equitable. Prescription, adverse posses-
sion,"' easement by necessity, and descent 6 will normally involve
legal interests. The others above named will usually be equitable.
The difference this makes will be alluded to hereafter.
6 See the dissent of Justice Moore in Yancy v. Batte, 48 Tex. 46 (1877). This dissent
is the basis for the rule in Texas.
Barrett v. Weimar, 130 S. W. 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) er. rel., rebuts the idea that
legal title is fluid in conveyance by a stranger to the wife. Divorce terminated the
husband's statutory agency conferred by Article 4619 even though the divorce decree
was not recorded under Article 6638, a purchaser from the husband being awarded
only a half interest.
7 Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111 (1883) ; Blankenship v. Douglas, 26 Tex. 225 (1862).
8 Heard v. Bowen, 184 S. W. 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) er. ref.
9 Texas Lumber Manufacturing Co. v. Branch, 60 Fed. 201 (5th Cir. 1894) ; New
York & Texas Land Co. v. Hyland, 28 S. W. 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) er. ref.
10 Senter & Co. v. Lambeth, 59 Tex. 259 (1883) ; Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex. 326
(1846).
11 Deaton v. Rush, 113 Tex. 176, 252 S. W. 1025 (1923).
12 Pokorny v. Yudin, 188 S. W. 2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), states that Article
6627 applies to easements created by implication. It would seem that estoppel would
be the proper basis.
"3 Eylar v. Eylar, 60 Tex. 315 (1883).
14 See Bowles v. Belt, 159 S. W. 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) er. ref. And see quotation
at note 1 supra.
15 See cases cited note 5 supra.
e See cases cited note 9 supra.
TEXAS RECORDING ACT
So it may safely be assumed that the recording act does not deal
with interests not in writing.
II. Are equitable interests within the recording law?
It has been stated that they are not, 7 and, of course, to what-
ever extent they are not in writing this is true. But a deed executed
by one who had only an equitable interest would surely be within.
In addition, it can be demonstrated that a contract for the sale
of real estate, if it effects an equitable conversion (that is, lays
the predicate for specific performance), is within Article 6627.1
The cases which hold that, though one has received a deed
embodying his equitable interest, he may still rely on the prece-
dent unrecordable equitable interest, 9 emphasize the distinction
between interests within and those outside the recording act.
It is emphasized throughout this discussion that only those
transfers described in Article 6627 are within its provisions. Ar-
ticle 6626 is broader in scope than Article 6627. Article 6626
states that any instrument embodying a transfer of any interest
in real property may be recorded. And Article 664620 states that
any such instrument properly recorded affords record notice.
But unless such an instrument is described in Article 6627, there
is no penalty within the recordation system for failure to record.
But Article 6626 would not apply to interests not in writing."
17 See cases cited note 2 supra.
18 In Linn v. LeCompte, 47 Tex. 440 (1877), an earlier contract for the sale of land,
unrecorded, was cut out by a judgment creditor of the vendor levying execution without
notice. This result could be based only on the assumption the contract was within
Article 6627. See McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Tex. 648 (1884).
19 Johnson v. Darr, cited note 2 supra; Roeser and Pendleton v. Stanolind Oil &
Gas Co., 138 S. W. 2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) er. ref.; J. S. Brown Hardware Co. v.
Marwitz, 32 S. W. 78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895). But see Michael v. Busby, 139 Tex. 278,
162 S. W. 2d 662 (1942).
20 "The record of any grant, deed or instrument of writing authorized or required
to be recorded, which shall have been duly proven or acknowledged for record and duly
recorded in the proper county, shall be taken and held as notice to all persons of the
existence of such grant, deed or instrument."
See Clements v. Taylor, 184 S. W. 2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
21 See statute quoted in note 3 supra.
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So if equitable interests reflected directly in an instrument
are recorded, record notice is afforded. If they are not recorded,
they cannot be cut off by operation of Article 6627 unless they
are described by Article 6627.
III. Are any interests other than those described in Article
6627 within the recording law?
What has been said under the preceding question is applicable
here. The answer is in the negative if the question of recording
of foreign wills is ignored.
It will become apparent that a more modest view of the opera-
tion of the recording law will be a more wholesome approach.
This is emphasized in an article by Professor Edgar N. Durfee
and Austin Fleming."2 If we apply Article 6627 as it is written
and do not assume it is a panacea for all the ills of secret claims,
we shall come nearer the mark. For eventually a court must recede
from a wider application than the statute warrants. 28 It is sug-
gested that the statute be applied to the. situations indicated by
its provisions, leaving other undesirable interests to the operation
of the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase, to estoppel, 24 to
lis pendens, 2 or to adverse possession.
26
IV. Does the recording law resolve the conflict between conflict-
ing claims, one of which is not subject to the recording law?
22 Res Judicata and Recording Acts:'Does a Judgment Conclude Non-Parties of
Whose Interests the Plaintiff Has No Notice? 28 Mich. L. Rev. 811, 813 (1930).
23 Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S. W. 54 (Tex. 1892), distinguishing cases where prior
interest is unrecordable.
24 Estoppel is the best basis on which Moran v. Wheeler, cited note 1 supra, may
be sustained.
25 The lis pendens statute does not operate with respect to interests created prior
to filing of lis pendens, Herbert v. Smith, 183 S. W. 2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
er. ref. w.m. It does, however, apply after the filing as to transfer by any party to the
suit, whether the transfer is within Article 6627 or not.
26 These doctrines may be termed lines of defense. The best and most obvious de-
fense is that the transaction was effective to transfer what it purports to transfer. If this
fails, then try the recording act, then bona fide purchase, then estoppel, and, last, ad-
verse possession. These are increasingly more difficult; in adverse possession usually
no connection with the former owner is present.
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It should first be noted that only conflicting claims give trouble,
for if there is no conflict between the two claims, no resolution
thereof is necessary. And, secondly, it is only to the extent of
the conflict that there is any need for resolution.27 A decision in
favor of a later deed over an earlier mortgage will wipe out the
mortgage to the extent the land described is the same. But a deci-
sion in favor of a later mortgage over an earlier deed does not
wipe out the deed entirely. It may be easier to see the effect of a
decision awarding priority to the later interest if the conflicting
claims are then treated as inverted in time.
Proceeding now to the question posed, suppose that one of the
conflicting claims is not within (not subject to) the recording law.
It may be either the earlier or the later claim.
We can start with the premise that if an interest cannot take
advantage of the protection of Article 6627 by recording, it should
not be subject to its penalty for failure to record. This principle
of mutuality is damaged somewhat in Texas by the effect of Ar-
ticle 6646 on Article 6626-that is, allowing an interest outside
Article 6627 but within Article 6626 to gain the protection of
recording. But protection is of two kinds-prospective and retro-
spective. The first is protection against instruments executed after
the recording of the claim in question. The other is protection
against instruments previously executed but not recorded at the
time of the creation of the claim in question. Article 6646 deals
only with the first and not with the other-with the prospective
and not the retrospective type of protection. So, realizing the effect
of the difference, we can say the principle of mutuality applies
in the more limited sense of the retrospective type.
Assume first that the unrecorded unrecordable interest with
2T At common law there was no thought of dividing the property. A powerful argu-
ment for division is contained in Costigan, The Theory of Chancery in Protecting
Against the Cestui Que Trust One Who Purchases from a Trustee for Value and With-
out Notice, 12 Calif. L. Rev. 356 (1924).
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respect to Article 6627 is the earlier claim and the later claim
is within Article 6627-that is, the latter interest is described
in Article 6627. There are many cases, where a creditor is the
later claimant, holding that the earlier claim is not affected." But
it may be argued that this rule as to creditors does not apply as
to purchasers and therefore does not clearly establish the prin-
ciple contended for. But in all the cases where the purchaser has
prevailed, it will be found that the earlier interest is equitable
and the later interest is legal.29 These are the requirements for
bona fide purchase as contrasted with the recording act (discussed
in the succeeding question). For example, while a later purchaser
within the recording act (if he gets legal title) may cut off an
earlier equitable interest of the heirs of the spouse not named
in a conveyance of property to a married man,8" he cannot cut off
an earlier claim acquired by adverse possession." The stated rea-
son is that an adverse possessor gets legal title.
So it would seem to be established that the recording act affords
no relief if the earlier claim is outside Article 6627.
What if the situation is reversed-the earlier claim is within
Article 6627 but the later claim is not? No case has been discov-
ered dealing with this situation. But if the recordable interest
would not be entitled to protection within Article 6627 if it was
the later interest (as above pointed out), it should not be sub-
jected to the penalty of Article 6627.
A situation that could arise is one where a deed is executed to
28 McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Tex. 648 (1884), for example.
29 Hill v. Moore, 62 Tex. 610 (1884). And see Gillette v. Davis, 15 S. W. 2d 1085,
1088 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
It would seem that Stahl v. Westerman, 250 S. W. 2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), and
Stinnette v. Mauldin, 251 S. W. 2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) er. rel. n. r. e., are
contra, but the point was not discussed in either. In Lutkel v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
243 S. W. 1068 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922), the later equitable claim was preferred on
the ground of estoppel.
30 Hill v. Moore, 62 Tex. 610 (1884).
31 See cases cited note 5 supra.
[Vol. 8
TEXAS RECORDING ACT
A of the surface excepting all the minerals, and A does not record.
B later starts adverse possession of the land but does not drill for
oil and gas. B stays on the property for ten years. What has B
acquired, the surface only or the surface and minerals? It is
believed he has acquired title to the surface only.82 In the Mac-
Gregor case88 the adverse possessor, as an earlier claimant, pre-
vailed without regard to the recording act; he should now not be
able to claim its protection as a later claimant.
Stated in another way, Article 6627 affords no resolution of the
conflict unless both conflicting claims are within Article 6627.
Of course, if neither claim is within Article 6627, the recording
act would be powerless to afford a resolution of the conflict.
V. What is the diference between a purchaser under the
equitable doctrine of bona lide purchase and a purchaser under
the recording law?
At common law the rule of first in time, first in right prevailed.8
A reference to the four possible contests shows this. (1) If the
contest was between an earlier legal claim and a later legal claim,
the contest would be in a court of law, and priority would be
awarded the earlier legal claim. A court of equity would refuse
jurisdiction as the remedy at law would be adequate. (2) If the
contest was between an earlier legal claim and a later equitable
claim, a court of law would prefer the earlier legal claim on the
above ground and also on the ground of non-recognition of
32 This result may be inferred from Wessels v. Rio Bravo Oil Co., 250 S. W. 2d 668
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952) er. ref. And what if B now executes an oil and gas lease to C,
an innocent purchaser. It is believed that C could not rely on the record. See note 33.
33 Cited note 5 supra. The title of an adverse possessor may also be treated as an
independent title. The recording act operates only with respect to claims under a com-
mon source. The adverse possessor, at least for some purposes, is not treated as ac-
quiring title from the owner, but independently. But a conveyance by the adverse
possessor, after his title has ripened, would be subject to the recording law, and the
adverse possessor could then be a common source.
34 An excellent discussion of the situation aside from the recording act and then
under it is presented in OSBORNE, MORTGAGES (1951) 456-604.
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equitable claims. A court of equity, if it assumed jurisdiction,
would favor the earlier legal claim on the ground that equity fol-
lows the law. (3) If the contest was between two equitable claims,
equity would favor the earlier equitable claim. A court of law
would refuse to recognize either. (4) Only in a contest between
an earlier equitable claim and a later legal claim would there be
any variance. A court of law would recognize only the legal claim.
So the equitable claimant would take the contest into a court of
equity. In a court of equity the earlier equitable claim would pre-
vail unless the later claim was legal. (This may explain the fre-
quent omission, that the later claim be legal, from the definition
of bona fide purchase. The claim must be legal before the other
elements of bona fide purchase are material.8") If the later claim
was legal, this claimant would prevail if he also showed that he
paid value, in good faith, and without notice-he must prove all,
in the conjunctive. A failure at any point was fatal.
Thus arose the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase-a
later claimant could defeat an earlier equitable claimant if the
later claimant could qualify as having acquired the legal title,
for value, in good faith, and without notice-four requirements.
And this defense impinged on the prior in time, prior in right rule
in only one-fourth of the possible contests.
And then recording acts as to lands were enacted. 6 It is usually
stated that they were designed to benefit subsequent purchasers,87
but it is equally clear that they benefited the first purchaser inas-
much as he could not tell whether he was first. And if it benefited
any purchaser, it would likewise benefit the seller, as the sellei
85 Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Wilhelm, 182 Fed. 474 (5th Cir. 1910) ; Texas Lurn-
ber Mfg. Co. v. Branch, 60 Fed. 201 (5th Cir. 1894) ; Hennessy v. Blair 107 Tex. 39,
173 S. W. 871 (1915) ; Slaughter v. Coke County, 79 S. W. 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904)
er. ref.
'o The first act in Texas was passed in 1836. SAYLEs, REAL ESTATE LAWS OF TEXAS
(1892) Art. 1055. The present law, Article 6627, is based on the Act of February 5,
1840. SAYLES, EARLY LAWS oF TEXAS (1888) Art. 748, § 4.




could be assured of getting the market value without allowance
for risk of loss of title.
It is usually assumed that all the recording act did was to make
notice of the earlier interest more readily available. This fits into
the pattern of the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase, as
absence of notice was one of the requirements of bona fide pur-
chase. And notice is usually the focal point of discussions of the
recording act.
But there is another method of approach-the recording acts
made an additional requirement to the common law requirements
for acquiring title; the purchaser must record to get the common
law protection of a first purchaser. This approach has great merit,
but it is unfamiliar, and that may be sufficient to condemn it.
The recording acts state that there is protection for takers of
specified interests if they are recorded, with a penalty for failure
to record in favor of takers of specified interests which come later
into conflict. In Texas the latter group is broader than the former
in that creditors are added." Purchasers were stated previously
to refer to purchasers of the same type of interest as that required
to be recorded. So the interests involved are those described by
the act whether the purchaser is earlier or later.
But a creditor can defeat an unrecorded claim required to be
recorded by Article 6627, though Article 6627 does not require
creditors to record. Article 6627 is construed to require a creditor
to have obtained a lien, 9 and Article 5449 grants a judgment lien
if properly abstracted. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allow
attachment' and execution liens.4 A debtor may give a voluntary
'I The purpose in setting creditors off from purchasers is to emphasize that purchase
refers to the same type of interest whether it is an earlier or later purchase. Creditors
can catch an interest only if the interest is within Article 6627, but the interest must
also be one subject to a writ of execution. This may have a limiting effect. See cases
cited note 99 infra.





lien to a creditor to secure an antecedent debt.4 Must the volun-
tary creditor record to secure prospective protection? No case
has discussed this question, which would test whether he is treated
as a purchaser or a creditor within Article 6627.4' This would be
tested by a case where the voluntary mortgage was earlier and
unrecorded; another creditor without notice levies an attachment
or execution. Would the later creditor prevail? Probably he would.
The theory of the operation of the recording act is that until
the holder of the specified interest records, a power is left in the
grantor, his heirs and assigns, to displace the prior interest.44 This
power continues until there is recorded a conveyance out of the
grantor. This theory serves as a good explanation and harmonizes
with the theory that an additional requirement is made of the
grantee. Until the additional requirement is fulfilled, the grantor
has not been wholly divested so far as the recording act is con-
cerned.
If the effect of the recording act stopped here, it would seem
that the recording act has affected the doctrine of bona fide pur-
chase only in making the giving of notice of the earlier interest
easier. But the subsequent purchaser still has the other elements
of bona fide purchase to prove.
It will later appear that value and good faith are the same in
both situations. But is there a requirement that a subsequent pur-
chaser under the recording act secure the legal title?45 If so, the
42 See text and cases cited infra at note 94.
43 Other than the question of burden of proof. See case cited note 95 inIra.
44 Lee v. Wysong, 128 Fed. 833 (5th Cir. 1904); Morris v. Meek, 57 Tex. 385
(1882) ; Keenon v. Burkhardt, 162 S. W. 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) er. ref. (devisees).
See Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 405, 415 (1924).
And see note 30 in article by Durfee and Fleming referred to supra at note 22.
45 Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Wilhelm, 182 Fed. 474 (5th Cir. 1910), states there
is no authority in Texas.
National Oil & Pipe Line Co. v. Teel, 95 Tex. 586, 68 S. W. 979 (1902), seems to
bottom its decision in a bona fide purchase case (not within the recording act, as the
opposing claim was based on fraud, an unrecordable interest) on the ground that an
oil and gas lessee did not get legal title. The cases following this are of the same type.
No case has been found applying the rule where the earlier interest was within Article
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act will be seriously hampered. Of course, if the purchaser does
secure the legal title, be may cut off prior equitable interests. If he
does not secure the legal title, the equitable doctrine of bona fide
purchase is not available. It is usually held that all the subsequent
purchaser need acquire is an interest which is specified in the act
as one which must be recorded46 (though it need not actually be
recorded in the so-called "notice" jurisdictions such as Texas47).
If the later interest is one specified by the recording act, can it
cut off to the extent of conflict an earlier interest which is equit-
able? It can only if the equitable interest is required to be re-
corded but is not recorded. This, of course, goes beyond the bona
fide purchase rule if the later interest is not legal.
Can a later equitable interest, required to be recorded, cut off
an earlier unrecorded legal interest? It can if the earlier legal
interest is required to be recorded.
So the requirement of the equitable doctrine of bona fide pur-
chase is modified (aside from notice) to obviate the acquisition
of legal title, by a requirement that one acquire some recordable
interest within Article 6627. If he does so, he will cut off earlier
interests whether legal or equitable, provided they are required
to be recorded by Article 6627.
Stated another way, Article 6627 is not concerned with whether
6627, testing the question whether legal title is necessary to the subsequent purchaser
under Article 6627.
A change in view as to the nature of an oil and gas lease has probably knocked out
the Teel case. See Deaton v. Rush, 113 Tex. 176, 252 S. W. 1025 (1923).
Batts and Dean v. Scott, 37 Tex. 59 (1872) (Reconstruction court), held that a
later contract for sale of real estate was within the recording act though it conferred
only an equitable title and could displace an earlier legal mortgage. A discussion of
this particular situation is contained in OSBORNE, MORTGAGES (1951) 548, in which
the author states the later purchaser should have to acquire only a recordable interest
but not necessarily legal. A backhanded recognition of this is contained in the case
cited in note 76 in/ra.
46 Johnson v. Newman, 43 Tex. 628 (1875); Texas Consolidated Compress & Mfg.
Assoc. v. Dublin Compress & Mfg. Co., 38 S. W. 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
47 Ranney v. Hogan, 1 Posey 253 (Tex. Comm. App. 1880); see White v. McGregor,
92 Tex. 556, 50 S. W. 564 (1899) ; Matthews v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 299 S. W.
450 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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titles are legal or equitable; it is concerned only with the interests
specified in the statute whether legal or equitable.4"
So the area of the recording act covers some of the area of bona
fide purchase but extends beyond it. It overlaps the doctrine of
bona fide purchase to the extent that the earlier interest is equitable
and the subsequent interest is legal, if both interests are specified
in the recording act. Not the whole area of bona fide purchase is
covered, however, the uncovered part being where the earlier
interest is equitable and the subsequent is legal but one or both
are not specified in the recording act. The coverage of the record-
ing act outside the area of bona fide purchase is that of conflicting
claims both specified by the recording act whether earlier equitable
against later equitable, earlier legal against later legal, or earlier
legal against later equitable-the other three of the four contests
discussed in pin-pointing bona fide purchase.
But the outside contests are not fully comprised within the
recording act--only to the extent the interests are in writing and
are specified in the recording act. So the recording act partially
covers the four possible contests but not in whole. The uncovered
part leaves the preceding common law rules in force.
There is, therefore, no occasion to say that the equitable doctrine
of bona fide purchase is wiped out. It stands ready to aid any
person who acquires the legal title as against earlier equitable
interests where one or both of the interests are not within the
recording act.
And do not suppose that area is small in Texas. The community
property system is an important factor in Texas law,-and its rule
is that only the named grantee in the deed has legal title, the
unnamed spouse having only an equitable interest.49 And the inter-
est of the unnamed spouse is unrecordable because it is not set
48 See statement in Johnson v. Newman, 43 Tex. 628, 641 (1875).
49 Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 98 S. W. 2d 346 (1936) ; Bordages v. Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co., 129 S. W. 2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) er. dism. judgt. cor.
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forth in a writing. Also, Texas has the other types of equitable
interests common in other states-resulting and constructive trusts,
and equities of rescission and reformation.
Texas actually is unique in the widespread field for the creation
of equitable interests. The community property rule above referred
to is avoided in some of the other states by a requirement that the
spouses both join in the conveyance out. Texas does not require
this. So in Texas there is not the necessity for inquiry about a wife.
At this point it may be inquired whether the distinction between
legal and equitable interests should be maintained in a state where
law and equity are supposed to be fused. Justice Gaines raised
this question in Edwards v. Brown.5" However interesting this
question may be, the jurisprudence of the state is so thoroughly
imbued with the distinction that it would take a major operation
to remove it. Adverse possession as to land does not start to run
against a grantor who has an equity of rescission until the deed
has been judicially rescinded.51 An instrument failing as a con-
veyance of legal title will, if justice demands, be treated as a con-
tract to convey.52 The law of trusts is bottomed on the distinction.
Whether a levy of execution is valid may turn on the distinction. 3
And other situations may occur to the reader.
VI. How does the recording act operate with respect to conflict-
ing claims within its provisions?
It has been shown that the recording act operates only with
respect to interests specified therein. And this is a considerable
restriction with respect to the entire field of possible transfers. In
addition, it does not cover recorded forgeries," recorded deeds
50 68 Tex. 329, 338, 4 S. W. 380, 5 S. W. 87, 90 (1887).
51 Deaton v. Rush, 113 Tex. 176, 252 S. W. 1025 (1923).
.52 TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1301.
53 See Clayton, Creditors' Bills in Texas, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 263, 265-267 (1927).
54 Trinity County Lumber Co. v. Pinckard, 23 S. W. 720, 1015 (Tex. Civ. App.
1893) er. ref.
Nor is there protection against mistaken identity: Blocker v. Davis, 241 S. W. 2d




executed by agents with no authority,55 nor undelivered or void
but recorded deeds. 6 Nor may the record reflect a power to dis-
affirm by minors and incompetents.57 But within the field of its
operation, restricted though it is,5" how does it operate? The dis-
cussion will take up purchasers first and then creditors, the two
classes named in Article 6627.
A. Purchasers.
This part will deal with who are purchasers and how does the
act operate as to them.
1. Subsequent purchasers are persons who acquire a record-
able interest within Article 6627 from or through a common
source and are in good faith, without notice, and pay value. (It is
unfortunate that another name was not coined to distinguish the
purchaser under the recording acts from the purchaser under the
equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase.)
a. The type of interest to be acquired has been previously dis-
cussed, and we take up next
b. Good faith. If this means anything other than absence of
55 Wall v. Lubbock, 118 S. W. 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) er. ref.
56 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Downey, 143 Tex. 171, 183 S. W. 2d 426 (1944);
Steffian v. Milmo National Bank, 69 Tex. 513, 6 S. W. 823 (1888) ; Garner v. Risinger,
81 S. W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) er. ref.
" Minors: Folts v. Ferguson, 24 S. W. 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) er. ref. Incompe-
tents: Jones v. Lind, 211 S. W. 2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; White v. Holland, 229
S. W. 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Mitchell v. Inman, 156 S. W. 290 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913) er. ref.
A list of these defects is set out in Pure Oil Co. v. Swindall, 58 S. W. 2d 7, 10 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1933). See also Rood, Registration of Land Titles, 12 Mich L. Rev. 379,
389-392 (1914), for a list of 19 defects.
58 The restrictions may be presented from another standpoint. The wrongdoer who
causes the conflict may be either the purchaser, an outsider, or the owner. The equitable
doctrine of bona fide purchase may apply to the first two but not the recording law.
The recording law normally applies only to the third.
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notice, it must be absence of actual knowledge. If one has actual
knowledge of an outstanding claim, he takes subject thereto."
c. Absence of notice. Record notice is the type of notice
added by the recording act, an easier means of giving notice of
one's interest.6" Whether an interest is properly of record is a
question not dealt with herein further than to say that it is the
record as transcribed which governs.6
The other type of notice (inquiry notice) existed under the
equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase and is the same in both
with the possible exception of the effect of seeing on record or in
an abstract an instrument not entitled to record as it appears in
the record or abstract."
As inquiry notice hinders the operation of the recording act,
it might be questioned whether it should have a place therein. To
those who seem to feel that absence of notice is an indispensable
element, it should be observed that legal rules are man-made, that
a few states do not require absence of notice,68 and that Texas
does not require a creditor who obtains his lien by judicial pro-
59 Houston Oil Co. v. Hayden, 104 Tex. 175, 135 S. W. 1149 (1911).
10 A recent case raised this interesting question: where there are two earlier un-
recorded interests only one of which is in conflict with a later interest and the later
purchaser is an innocent purchaser as regards both earlier interests, only one of which
need be displaced to give effect to the later, which one of the earlier yields? It seems to
be held that the later of the two earlier is displaced. But what if the innocent purchaser
has notice of the later of the two earlier transfers? The case seems to hold the earliest
loses. So notice to an innocent purchaser determines which of two purchasers loses.
Hunley v. Bulowski, 256 S. W. 2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) er. ref. n.r.e.
Record of a deed conveying an easement is record notice though the main purpose
of the deed is to convey a lot other than the one through which the easement runs.
Latimer v. Hess, 183 S. W. 2d 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) er. ref.
61 In re Rose, 22 F. Supp. 988 (W. D. Tex. 1938).
62 No notary seal on acknowledgment - recorded - on question of improver in
good faith, stated even if seen on record there would be no inquiry notice, Daugherty
v. Yates, 35 S. W. 937 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896). Seeing lis pendens and order of dis-
missal in abstract put on inquiry notice as to claim, Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S. W. 2d 692
(Tex. Comm. App. 1928).
63 See PATTON, TiTLs (1938) § 8.
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ceedings to be free of notice at the time he obtains his lien on
chattels."
As to inquiry notice, aside from possession, little need be said.
It is a question whether sufficient facts from a reliable source are
given the purchaser to excite his inquiry. 5 Notice from posses-
sion of land calls for some discussion. It is stated that possession
of land gives notice of every valid claim the possessor has, includ-
ing that of his landlord.66 Two exceptions need be noted, the first
being the grantor-in-possession rule. It is to the effect that if the
one in possession is the grantor in a prior conveyance, whether
recorded or not, it will be presumed that he claims no interest
as against his deed.67 After some vacillation it was held that the
rule is not applicable if the grantor holds by tenant.6"
The second exception is that if the one in possession has a
64 Lindig v. Johnson City State Bank, 41 S. W. 2d 222 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931).
The doctrine of notice was deplored in Guilbeau v. Mays, 15 Tex. 410 (1855). And
see Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 98 S. W. 2d 346 (1936).
65 See Ramirez v. Bell, 298 S. W. 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) er. ref., to effect that
recital of $5000 consideration in deed to land worth $10,000 is basis for inquiry when
of recent date. Also see Luck v. Welch, 243 S. W. 2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. ref.
n.r.e.; Downing v. Jeffrey, 195 S. W. 2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) er. ref. n.r.e.
Several cases have protected the purchaser though he knew or should have known
the seller was married, holding he need not inquire whether the wife had died, where
the property was community. Lyster v. Leighton, 81 S. W. 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904)
er. ref.; Smith v. Olson, 56 S. W. 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) er. ref.
"( Burford v. Pounders, 145 Tex. 460, 199 S. W. 2d 141 (1947) ; Jackson v. DeGuerin,
124 Tex. 424, 77 S. W. 2d 1041 (1935) ; Howard v. Leonard, 185 S. W. 2d 490 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1945) er. ref. w.m.
67 Eylar v. Eylar, 60 Tex. 315 (1883). Is there any limitation as to length of time
grantor remains in possession? Davis v. Cox, 176 S. W. 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (4
years-notice); Segal v. Saunders, 220 S. W. 2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) er. ref.
n.r.e. (17 years-no notice). Exception is inapplicable where grantor has equity of
reformation, Bumpas v. Zachary, 34 S. W. 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), and to non-
delivery of deed, Cardwell v. Shifflet, 294 S. W. 519 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
Estoppel is basis-not necessary purchaser check the record if deed is exhibited to
him, Anglin v. Cisco Mortgage Loan Co., 135 Tex. 188, 141 S. W. 2d 935 (1940) :
Barron v. Theophilakos, 13 S. W. 2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Bryant v. Grand
Lodge Sons of Herman, 152 S. W. 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) er. ref. But knowledge
of deed held sufficient in Guaranty Bond State Bank v. Kelley, 13 S. W. 2d 69 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1929).
6s Pondrum v. Gray, 298 S. W. 409 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927), rehearing denied, 1
S. W. 2d 278 (1928). But see Dallas Trust & Say. Bank v. Pickett, 59 S. W. 2d 1090
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933) er. dism.
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recorded interest entitling him to possession, his possession will
be held to be referable to that record and limited thereby.69 But
Texas has refused to apply this where the one in possession is a
tenant in common by the record but has received an unrecorded
conveyance from a cotenant."0
d. Value. Value is consideration which has been performed.
A mere promise could be consideration but is not value unless
put in the form of a negotiable instrument.7' But if the promise
has been performed, it is value. Performance of promises of
almost any character can be value except that release of or secur-
ity for an antecedent debt is not value in land transactions.7 2 But
change of position by extension of time of payment,m or release
of other security or sureties may be value.7'
If only part performance has occurred before notice but the
purchaser has received an interest within Article 6627, then he
19 Grogan-Cochran Lumber Co. v. McComb, 192 S. W. 2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945) er. ref.; Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Sugg, 237 S. W. 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)
er. ref. These two exceptions seem to be treated as arising out of the Eylar case, cited
note 67 supra, in National Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 60 S. W. 2d 429 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1933).
In Linthicum v. Greer, 75 S. W. 2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) er. dism., and Hamilton
v. Ingram, 35 S. W. 748 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), the exception was applied to a lease
though this exception is frequently held inapplicable to tenants, 5 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1291.
70 Collum v. Sanger Bros., 98 Tex.' 162, 82 S. W. 459, 83 S. W. 184 (1904).
71Keenon v. Burkhardt, 162 S. W. 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) er. ref.
72 McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Tex. 648 (1884) ; Walter Connally & Co. v. Gaston, 295
S. W. 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) er. dism. The McKamey case also holds that TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 3818 does not make an antecedent debt value in
execution sales. Compromise held value in Janes v. O'Fiel, 280 S. W. 163 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1926), later proceedings, 299 S. W. 640 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
If the land is the bargained-for consideration for services, the performed services
are value, Masterson v. Crosby, 152 S. W. 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), but if the land
is an accord and satisfaction of payment for the same services (release of antecedent
debt), the release is not value. This may need explaining.
For a list of cases where value was held inadequate, see McAnally v. Panther, 26
S. W. 2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
78 Red River National Bank in Clarksville v. Latimer, 110 S. W. 2d 232 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937).
74 Case cited in note 73; Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hutcheson, 254 S. W. 2d 802 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1952).
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will be protected pro tanto under the rule of Durst v. Daugherty.5
But if one of the two conflicting interests is not within Article
6627, then the subsequent purchaser must have got legal title to
be protected pro tanto against an earlier equitable claim.76
2. Operation as to purchasers.
There is very little discussion of the word "subsequent" in
connection with purchasers under the recording act.7" The word
"subsequent" means later in point of time, but the question is,
later than what? It must mean later than an earlier deed executed
by the admitted common source, but must the subsequent deed
be executed by the common source? For example, X conveys to A
and then X conveys to R, A then conveys to B, and R then conveys
to S. All deeds are subsequent in point of time to the deed to A,
but are we restricted to calling the deed to R the subsequent con-
veyance, or could we call the deed to S or even the deed to B
subsequent?
To present the problem as clearly as possible it would seem
necessary to set up three situations, designated Situations (a),
(b), and (c).
(a) X conveys first to A who records. X then conveys to R
after A has recorded. R then records.
X Deed 1X 2A
X Deed 3X 4R
75 81 Tex. 650, 17 S. W. 388 (1891).
76 Stahl v. Westerman, 250 S. W. 2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), is contra. The
court labored to show the earlier interest was equitable without noting that the later
interest was also equitable. The earlier interest was unrecordable-heirs of the spouse
not named in the deed into the community; the later interest was a contract of sale--
an equitable though recordable interest. So this case is contrary to my conclusion in
question IV, but the point was not discussed and no writ of error was applied for.
77 See discussion in Williams, Recordation Hiatus and Cure by Limitation, 29 Tex.
L. Rev. 1, 3-9 (1950).
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(b) X conveys first to A. Thereafter X conveys to R. A then




(c) X conveys first to A. Thereafter X conveys to R. R records
and thereafter A records.
X Deed AX 4A
XDeed 2X 3R
(The number on top of the line indicates the order of delivery
of the deeds; the number below the line indicates the order of
recordation. This establishes the sequence.)
These diagrams will be helpful in discussing White v. Mc.
Gregor78 and Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball79 because the first case
falls in Situation (a) whereas the second falls in Situation (c).
The decisions in these two cases are correct; it is the reasoning
which gives trouble.
In White v. McGregor, B, a purchaser from A, paid value with-
out notice of R's conveyance and claimed priority. B was awarded
priority. This case can be stated to be an application of the well-
settled rule that a purchaser is not charged with record notice of
a conveyance executed after the recordation of deed in his (B's)
chain."0
The discussion in the case to the effect that the recordation of
deeds in R's chain did not affect purchasers in the A chain is
unreliable and meaningless to a title examiner. In the first place,
78 92 Tex. 556, 50 S. W. 564 (1899).
TO 103 Tex. 94, 122 S. W. 533, 124 S. W. 85 (1909).
80 5 TIFFANY, RFAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1268.
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a member of the court which decided this case explained the deci-
sion away by stating that A was an innocent purchaser for value
and B prevailed because A would."' Secondly, the rule that B need
not search for a possible conveyance to R is true only in Situation
(a). This was demonstrated in Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball.
So if the announced rule was needed, it applies in only one of
three possible situations.'
Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball belongs in Situation (c). A con-
veyed to B, and R conveyed to S, both conveyances being executed
after both A and R had recorded.
It was previously stated that under the recording law a power
resides in the common source (X) to displace earlier convey-
ances from the common source until one of the grantees from
X records. In Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, X lost this power when
R recorded. As A also recorded before B and S purchased, the
rights of the parties were then crystallized. There was no possibil-
ity then that B or S could do better than his respective grantor,
A orR.
This is mentioned because the court stated that B could not have
done better than A even though R had not recorded. This state-
ment was dictum and harmful to proper functioning of the record-
ing system. It interprets subsequent to mean subsequent in chain
as opposed to the broader meaning of subsequent in time.
Putting these two cases together, they hold that a prospective
purchaser, B (from A), need not search for deeds executed by X
later than the recordation of the deed to A. (White v. McGregor.)
This is Situation (a). But B (a purchaser from A) must search
for a deed executed by X to R after the deed to A, when the deed
to A is recorded after the deed R (Situation (c)). (Houston Oil
8131 Tex. Assn. J. 104 ff. (1912).
82 But it was applied in Situation (b) in Fullenwider v. Ferguson, 70 S. W. 222
(Tex. Civ. App. 1902) er. ref., to protect B, a purchaser from A, although A would
have lost to R.
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Co. v. Kimball.) No extra search is involved in the latter case as
B would have to search as to X down at least to the date of the
recording of the deed to A, and this would disclose the deed of
Xto R.
MustjB search for a possible deed from X to R executed after
the deed to A, but before the recordation of A's deed, but not
recorded until after A's deed? This is Situation (b).
There are no decisions in Texas on this point but there is a
decision where S is purchasing from R in Situation (c).8 It is
held that S must search down to the time of the purchase by S.
If this is true, B in making his search to make sure that he is not
actually S, will find any deed recorded up to the time of B's pur-
chase. To be sure, Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball states in dictum
that B would not be protected even if R has not recorded up to the
time of B's purchase, but this is such an undesirable result that
only a clearcut holding would be given credence. 4
Ideally, a purchaser B (from A) should not have to check later
than date (3) in Situation (b). This would in effect make such
a state a race-notice jurisdiction as to purchasers from A. But
Texas does not so limit search."5
Breen v. Morehead"8 restricts the beginning of search as to X
to the date of the deed into X. So the period of search in Texas,
s8 Delay v. Truitt, 182 S. W. 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) er. ref.
54 In Fletcher v. Ellison, 1 Posey 661 (Tex. Comm. App. 1880), it was held that B
could prevail if R had not recorded up to time of B's purchase. Accord, Requa v;
Joseph, 225 S. W. 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). These decisions are in accord with the
argument in White v. McGregor but not that in Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball.
85 Philbrick, supra note 37, fully discusses the burden imposed by Delay v. Truitt.
cited note 83 supra. Williams refers to the matter at p. 14 of the article referred to in note
77 supra, though the statement that the result in the Kimball case would have been
otherwise is not understood.
86 104 Tex. 254, 136 S. W. 1047 (1911). Foreshadowed in Copelin v. Shuler, 6
S. W. 668 (Tex. 1887).
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as to each person, is from the date of the deed into each person
in the title down to the present.8 7
One further word-the purchaser, to get more than his grantor
had, must take by deed and not by quitclaim."8 If this means that
the purchaser is warned thereby that the grantor is conferring only
the rights he has, there is some justification for the view.89 But
there is little justification for the alternate view that the quitclaim
itself warns the purchaser that there is something wrong with the
title.
Two matters ameliorate this position. First, the grantor in the
quitclaim cannot himself set up a claim as against a bona fide pur-
chase.9" And second, if value is paid, the form of the deed is
ignored.9' As value has to be paid in any event to qualify a bona
fide purchaser, the latter view removes the quitclaim deed rule.9"
B. Creditors.
This group is defined as those who acquire a lien by judicial
proceedings- abstracting a judgment, or levy of execution or
attachment.93 It also includes one who obtains a lien voluntarily
87 Note 82 refers to a case which, if followed, would state that in the search by B
a deed to R in Situation (b) could be ignored. This leaves the extended search by S
for Situation (c) still required under Delay v. Truitt, quoted note 83 supra.
88 Benton Land Co. v. Jopling, 300 S. W. 28 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927); Houston
Oil Co. of Texas v. Niles, 255 S. W. 604 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923); Wilkins v. Aber-
crombie, 162 S. W. 2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). This rule applies in both the
recording and the bona fide purchase situations.
But heirs and devisees of a grantor in an unrecorded conveyance can create rights
in an innocent purchaser under the recording act though they should not be in a better
position than a taker under a quitclaim.
s9 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1277.
o Meacham v. Halley, 103 F. 2d 967 (5th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 572
(1939).
91 Wallace v. Crow, 1 S. W. 372 (Tex. Comm. App. 1886) ; Moore v. Swift, 67 S. W.
1065 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
92 See Comment, 6 Tex. L. Rev. 518, 521 (1928). There is this much difference-- if
X conveys to R, and R to S, S could ordinarily prevail by showing either R or S was
a bona fide purchaser. But if the conveyance to R is by quitclaim, S will be able to
prevail only by showing R is a bona fide purchaser.
93 Brown & Co. v. Chancellor, 61 Tex. 437 (1884).
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from the debtor as security for an antecedent debt.94 The only
difference between the two is that the voluntary lienor has the
burden to prove absence of notice of a preceding interest while
in the case of the involuntary lienor the burden of proof as to
notice is on his opponent, the earlier claimant.9" (Under Article
6627 as to purchasers, the burden of proof as to notice is on the
subsequent purchaser, 6 but if the earlier claimant has only an
equitable interest the burden of proof is on him.97)
The voluntary lienor apparently need not record to win except
as to subsequent purchasers (however that is defined). This
means that an antecedent debt is not value in deeds but it is
value in mortgages!
The involuntary lienor must attach, levy execution, or abstract
his judgment as a lien. If the lienor has no notice at the time he
secures his lien, he is protected.9" But apparently the abstracted
lien catches no more than an attachment or levy would catch.99
An exception without much reason is made if the deed into the
4 McKeen v. Sultenfuss, 61 Tex. 325 (1884). Not true as to personal property,
Lindig v. Johnson City State Bank, 41 S. W. 2d 222 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931).
115 Turner v. Cochran, 94 Tex. 480, 61 S. W. 923 (19011).
9,c See case cited in the preceding note.
97 Farmers Mutual Royalty Syndicate, Inc. v. Isaacks, 138 S. W. 2d 228 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940) ; Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208 (1939), rev'g 100 F. 2d
294 (5th Cir. 1938), 101 F. 2d 314 (1939) (rehearing). But what if the equitable
interest is recordable under Article 6627? No discussion has been found.
But if the equity is that of rescission for fraud, the burden appears to be on the
purchaser. Morrison v. Cotton, 152 S. W. 866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
A claimant under an unrecorded title judgment (Article 6628) has the burden of
proof as to a later conveyance. Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 73 S. W. 2d
490, 107 S. W. 2d 564 (1937).
t18 Blum v. Schwartz, 20 S. W. 54 (Tex. 1892) ; Linn v. LeCompte, 47 Tex. 440
(1877) ; Grace v. Wade & Mains, 45 Tex. 522 (1876) ; Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Tex. 593
(1864).
99 Munzesheimer v. Leopold, 163 S. W. 2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) er. rel. w.m.;
South Texas Lumber Co. v. Nicoletti, 54 S. W. 2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) er. dism.;
Sugg v. Mozoch, 293 S. W. 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) er. ref.; J. S. Brown Hardware
Co. v. Marwitz, 32 S. W. 78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895); Davis v. Wheeler, 23 S. W.
435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
judgment debtor is not recorded.'0 0 In that case abstracting the
judgment is not enough to catch prior unrecorded though record-
able interests out of the judgment debtor; there must be a levy
or attachment. 1 1
The creditor does not catch earlier unrecorded interests not
within Article 6627, and this probably includes in the term
"creditor" the voluntary creditor who takes to secure an ante-
cedent debt. 102 This is a situation where the ability to recognize
an unrecordable interest is very important.
Of course, if a third person purchases at the execution sale,
he can qualify under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase,
provided the legal title passes and the prior interest is an un-
recordable equitable interest. The third person could also qualify
under the recording act as a purchaser if at the time of sale he
had no notice, although the lienor had notice, and prevail over
recordable though unrecorded interests, legal or equitable. But
the judgment creditor cannot be such a purchaser, as crediting
his judgment is not a value transaction. 03
A final matter- it has not been definitely decided in Texas
whether a creditor is precluded from prevailing against a prior
unrecorded (though recordable) interest as to credit extended
before the creation of the unrecorded interest. It is so limited
in some states." 4 The only case discussing the matter in Texas
100 In a Comment, 3 Southw. L. J. 91 (1949), the writer seems to assume that
the situation is that of deeds out of the judgment debtor. This would appear to be
erroneous.
101 Peurifoy v. Wiebusch, 132 Tex. 36, 117 S. W. 2d 773 (1938) ; Sugg v. Mozoch,
293 S. W. 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) er. ref.; Lewis v. San Antonio Belt & Terminal Ry.,
208 S. W. 552, 991 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) er. ref; Hooker v. Eakin, 176 S. W. 80 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1915) er. ref.
102 Shear Co. v. Currie, 295 Fed. 841 (5th Cir. 1923). But Bowles v. Belt, 159
S. W. 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) er. rel., had held that an assignment of a vendor's
lien is within Article 6627 and is subordinated to an abstract of judgment.
101 Ayres v. Duprey, 27' Tex. 593 (1864).
'o0 See 5 TIFFArY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1282.
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seems to say it is only to the extent credit was previously extended
that there can be protection to the creditor.'0 5 But this seems
dubious.
McDonald v. Powell Lumber Co.' °6 is an excellent case to indi-
cate the operation of the recording act as to creditors. X executed
a deed to A; this deed was not recorded. X then executed a
mortgage to R. It was not stated whether it was to secure an ante-
cedent debt to R or a present extension of credit by R. So we
cannot tell from the opinion whether R was a voluntary creditor
or was a purchaser.
R foreclosed in court, suing X but not A and secured judgment
of foreclosure. Forty-eight days later an order of sale issued, and
the property was purchased by R (presumably). R conveyed to
S, and S sued A.
Two questions were involved: (1) was R's lien prior to A;
and (2) was A foreclosed?
The fact that these questions are radically different is fre-
quently unnoticed. A decision awarding priority to the lien does
not excuse nonjoinder in a court foreclosure of the displaced
grantee in the deed.
It was assumed that R had priority over 4, and this could
be true whether R was originally a creditor or a purchaser within
Article 6627.107 As to the foreclosure it was held that R became
a creditor within Article 6627 either at the time of judgment or
the time of levy of the order of sale, a choice not being necessary.
(It probably would be necessary in rationalizing Gamble v. Mar-
105 Farley v. McAlister, 39 Tex. 602 (1873). And see Barrett v. Barrett's Adm., 31
Tex. 344 (1868). Both were decided by the Reconstruction court. The confusion
centers around the assumption that the creditor prevails on the theory of fraudulent
conveyance. This might be an additional ground for recovery but is not a necessary
basis for protection under Article 6627.
106 243 S.W. 2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. ref.
107 See case cited note 95 supra.
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tin,"'8 as the deed to Ashby S. James completing the record chain
of title, was recorded four days after judgment and, presumably,
before issuance of order of sale.)
As R became a creditor (possibly for the second time - first
voluntary and later involuntary), it was held that A was cut off
by the sale unless A could prove R had notice before the judg-
ment or levy of the order of sale. If R purchased at the sale he
could get no more than the levy caught, as R would be crediting
the judgment, not a value transaction." 9 If a third person pur-
chased at the sale, he would have a chance to qualify as a pur-
chaser under the recording act, though not under the equitable
doctrine, as A's interest was legal."0
This decision offers the possibility of curing defective fore-
closures - surely a worthwhile project in a state where 1is pen-
dens has only its common law effect of catching interests created
after notice of lis pendens is filed, by persons made parties to
the suit."'
It might be remarked that if the foreclosure had been out of
court by exercise of a power of sale, A would have been cut out.
It seems to be the rule that exercise of a power of sale in a deed
of trust cuts out all junior claimants who have notice of the power
of sale." 2 This elimination in such an easy manner may account
for a frequently displayed reluctance to hold that in a court fore-
closure an overlooked junior claimant to the equity of redemption
is not barred." 8
10s 151 S. W. 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) er. ref.
109 See text at note 103 supra.
110 Brinkman v. Tinker, 117 S. W. 2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) er. ref. And see
Winchester v. Boggs, 112 S. W. 2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
111 Martin v. Marquardt, 111 S. W. 2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
112 Harper v. Over, 101 S. W. 2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
113 For example, State v. Forest Lawn Lot Owners Assn., ... Tex ........ 254 S. W. 2d
87 (1953) ; McDonald v. Miller, 90 Tex. 309, 39 S. W. 89 (1897).
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Two examples of the resolution of conflicts are given to illus-
trate, one hypothetical and one actual.
An admitted record owner, X, conveys to a husband(H) prop-
erty purchased with community funds. This places legal title in
H, with H's wife, W, getting an equitable half interest. 4 But H
fails to record. A creditor of X levies an execution on the land
without notice of the interest of H and W. If the creditor pur-
chases at the sale, he will get only an undivided half interest
(that of H) as W's interest is unrecordable." 5 If a stranger pur-
chases at the sale and has no notice at the time of the sale, he
could get W's interest too, not by the recording act but under the
equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase." 6
The second example- X owns the property of record, but A
has an unrecordable half interest therein based on an equity of
reformation. A judgment creditor of X, C, levies without notice,
and at the sale C and D purchase together, C crediting the judg-
ment for half the purchase price and D paying the sheriff the other
half of the purchase price. It was held that D gets an undivided
one-half interest as he is a bona fide purchaser under the equitable
doctrine; A had an undivided fourth left, as he could be displaced
only by bona fide purchase and here only to the extent of half
of his half; C got the remaining fourth, a half of what the execu-
tion lien actually caught. This case" 7 illustrates the inter-play of
the applicable rules properly applied.
114 See text at note 6 supra.
115 In Davis v. Wheeler, 23 S. W. 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893), X conveyed to a
married woman, the property becoming presumptively community. Purchase money
notes were executed to X, but no express vendor's lien was retained. This created a
grantor's lien, an equitable lien. The deed was not recorded. Subsequently C, a creditor
of X, levied execution as the property of X. C purchased at the sale but had notice
at that time. An assignee of the grantor's lien was allowed foreclosure against C. The
levy did not catch the actual interest of X (even if X then still owned the notes) as
it was not subject to levy of execution. In addition, a creditor does not catch an un-
recordable interest. The levy did catch the legal title and one-half beneficial interest of
the wife. It is not clear whether the court held the husband's half interest caught by the
levy. The husband did not appeal. The husband's interest is in the same category
as the equitable lien; neither was recordable.
"(I McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Tex. 648 (1884).




This discussion would indicate that the scope of the recording
act in Texas is more nearly that described by Johnson v. Darr...
than by Moran v. Wheeler:'"
1. That only an interest in writing is within the recording law.
2. That only those equitable interests which are described in
a writing and are specified in the recording act are within the
recording law.
3. That only those transfers specified in the recording act are
within the recording law.
4. That the recording act does not resolve conflicting claims
unless both are specified transfers within the recording law.
5. That while a subsequent purchaser under the equitable
doctrine of bona fide purchase must acquire the legal title and
cut off precedent equitable claims, the subsequent purchaser
under the recording law need only acquire a specified transfer
under the recording law, whether legal or equitable, and can cut
off any type of preceding transfer if specified in the recording
law, whether legal or equitable.
6. It is difficult to summarize the restricted area within which
the recording act actually operates, but it may be said that White
v. McGregor is an over-rated authority. If the rule announced in
either White v. McGregor or the Kimball case had been applied
in the other, the result would have been different. Restricted to
their facts the decisions are sound. It is to be hoped that it is
still possible to construe subsequent purchaser to mean subsequent
in time, as this furthers recording policy.
118 Quoted at note 2 supra.
119 Quoted at note 1 supra.
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